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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Impact of U.S. Free Trade Agreements
on Calorie Availability and Obesity: A Natural
Experiment in Canada
Pepita Barlow, MSc,1 Martin McKee, MD, DSc,2 David Stuckler, MPH, PhD3
Introduction: Globalization via free trade and investment agreements is often implicated in the
obesity pandemic. Concerns center on how free trade and investment agreements increase
population exposure to unhealthy, high-calorie diets, but existing studies preclude causal
conclusions. Few studies of free trade and investment agreements and diets isolated their impact
from confounding changes, and none examined any effect on caloric intake, despite its critical role in
the etiology of obesity. This study addresses these limitations by analyzing a unique natural
experiment arising from the exceptional circumstances surrounding the implementation of the 1989
Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
Methods: Data from the UN (2017) were analyzed using ﬁxed-effects regression models and the
synthetic control method to estimate the impact of the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement on
calorie availability in Canada, 1978–2006, and coinciding increases in U.S. exports and investment in
Canada’s food and beverage sector. The impact of changes to calorie availability on body weights was
then modeled.
Results: Calorie availability increased by ≅170 kilocalories per capita per day in Canada after the
Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. There was a coinciding rise in U.S. trade and investment in the
Canadian food and beverage sector. This rise in calorie availability is estimated to account for an
average weight gain of between 1.8 kg and 12.2 kg in the Canadian population, depending on sex and
physical activity levels.
Conclusions: The Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement was associated with a substantial rise in
calorie availability in Canada. U.S. free trade and investment agreements can contribute to rising
obesity and related diseases by pushing up caloric intake.
Am J Prev Med 2018;54(5):637–643. & 2018 American Journal of Preventive Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc.
All rights reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
INTRODUCTION
T
he escalating global prevalence of overweight and
obesity, or “globesity,” is often described as a
pandemic.1 Worldwide, it is estimated that rates
of overweight and obesity combined rose by 27.5% for
adults and 47.1% for children between 1980 and 2013.2
Globalization via free trade agreements (FTAs) is often
implicated in this pandemic because of its role in
spreading high-calorie diets rich in salt, sugar, and fat.3
These concerns have become increasingly prominent in
recent years, as new FTAs have been negotiated at an
unprecedented rate, rising from 22 active FTAs in 1990
to more than 270 in 2016.4 They include the Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a potential
agreement between the U.S. and the European Union,
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and a possible United Kingdom–U.S. deal.5 Public health
specialists have argued that new FTAs could worsen diets
and exacerbate rising rates of obesity.3
However, a recent systematic review showed that
evidence of a link between FTAs and unhealthy diets
and obesity was methodologically and substantively
limited.6 Methodologically, previous studies have not
addressed critical challenges to causal inference when
analyzing the impact of FTAs. One challenge is that FTAs
are often implemented in response to major macro-
economic crises or alongside market-oriented policies,
such as deregulation.7 These transformations can also
inﬂuence diets, making it difﬁcult to isolate the impact of
FTAs.8 In addition, there is often a delay of several years
between when an FTA is agreed upon and when it is
implemented, making it difﬁcult to identify the appro-
priate pre- and post-FTA cut off.9 Previous studies were
unable to disentangle this complexity.
Substantively, previous analyses of FTAs and diets
focused on a narrow range of outcomes: high-fructose
corn syrup supply and sugar-sweetened beverage sales.9–12
However, whether or not FTAs contribute to rising
obesity depends, in part, on whether they increase
peoples’ net caloric intake (i.e., caloric intake less caloric
expenditure), as this plays a critical role in the etiology of
obesity.13 FTAs may do so by facilitating trade in the food
and beverage sector as they reduce trade barriers, such as
tariffs (a type of trade tax) and non-tariff barriers, such as
differences in technical or quality standards. FTAs can
also boost domestic food and beverage production when
barriers (such as a lack of investor protection) to foreign
investment are removed.3,14 These changes can, in turn,
lead to lower prices; greater availability; and greater
marketing of food, beverages, and their ingredients.
These three factors can alter diets, as they affect the
composition and quantity of food and beverage produc-
tion and consumption.3
Whether or not these changes encourage higher
caloric intake is likely to vary according to the partner
country, and U.S. FTAs are especially likely to encourage
elevated caloric intake because of the highly competitive
processed food and caloric beverage industry in the
U.S.15 Processed food and caloric beverages play an
important role in increasing caloric intake, as they are
often calorie dense, leading people to unknowingly
consume too many calories, and highly palatable,
encouraging further consumption. In addition, drinking
caloric beverages can contribute to increased caloric
intake, as it is rarely compensated for by an equivalent
reduction in food consumption.16–18
This study addresses these gaps by analyzing a unique
natural experiment, the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment (CUSFTA) in 1989. This study tests the hypotheses
that CUSFTA increased caloric intake in Canada and that
these changes corresponded with increased U.S. exports
and investment in the Canadian food and beverage
sector.
Dunning19 identiﬁes three criteria that characterize a
natural experiment. First, exposure to the intervention
(here the FTA) and control must be as-if random. In this
way, it simulates a randomized trial, although assignment
of the intervention is outside the researchers’ control.
Second, the statistical models must be credible so that
differences between intervention and control groups are
not attributable to confounders, and third, the case must
have substantive relevance.19 The following section
describes how CUSFTA meets these criteria.
On January 1, 1989, CUSFTA came into force.
CUSFTA reduced barriers to trade and investment
between the U.S. and Canada in most sectors of the
economy, including the food and beverage industry, as
summarized in Appendix 1 (available online). CUSFTA
was subsumed by the North American Free Trade
Agreement on January 1, 1994, which changed few trade
arrangements between the U.S. and Canada, as these
were covered by CUSFTA.
CUSFTA is in many ways a unique natural experi-
ment. First, CUSFTA is substantively relevant, as it was a
blueprint for later FTAs.20 Second, CUSFTA was not part
of a larger package of reforms or implemented in
response to a macroeconomic crisis so, unlike most
FTAs, it is not confounded by these changes.7 Third,
the pre- and post-FTA periods are clearly demarcated,
and fourth, CUSFTA was unanticipated. This is because
the fate of CUSFTA was decided by the Canadian general
election in 1988. This so-called Free Trade Election was
very closely contested and centered on whether to
implement CUSFTA.21 One side was pro-CUSFTA and
the other against. No one could be certain who would
win—and so whether CUSFTA would be implemented—
until the outcome of the election in November 1988.
This created a distinct pre- and post-FTA cut off
and addresses issues created by potential anticipatory
effects.
Fifth, CUSFTA’s implementation was as-if random.
CUSFTA’s implementation was contingent on the out-
come of the 1988 election. But the victory of the pro-
CUSFTA party was a quasi-random event: most Cana-
dians voted for parties that opposed CUSFTA, but the
pro-CUSFTA party secured a marginal victory and
implemented the FTA, as they won a majority of votes
in two provinces that, because of Canada’s electoral
formula, elected more seats than the remaining eight
Canadian provinces combined.22 In addition, CUSFTA
was implemented almost immediately after the election
on January 1, 1989. Thus, CUSFTA was not implemented
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in response to any changes that occurred in Canada after
the marginal victory.
This study evaluates the impact of CUSFTA on calorie
availability in Canada, assesses whether changes in trade
and investment potentially mediated this association, and
simulates the impact of dietary changes on body weight.
METHODS
Study Sample
Appendix 2 (available online) summarizes the data sources and
variables used in the analysis. The impact of CUSFTA on Canadian
diets was estimated using public and de-identiﬁed annual calorie
availability data from the UN Food and Agricultural Ofﬁce
Statistics Ofﬁce.23 This captures the total quantity of food and
beverages available for human consumption in kilocalories (kcal)
per capita per day. Calorie availability is a widely used proxy for
consumption that is more widely available than individual survey
measures, which were not available in Canada or on a cross-
national basis during the study period.24 Data on country-level
covariates of calorie availability were sourced from the World
Bank World Development Indicators, 2015 Edition.25 Trade and
investment data were from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.26,27 Body weight and
height data used for weight change modeling were based on data
from the Canadian Health Promotion Survey in 1990 when data
were ﬁrst available.28
Measures
A ﬁxed-effects regression model was used to compare changes to
calorie availability in Canada with comparison countries, 1978–
2006. The model is given by:
Yit¼α0 þ γi þ βDit þ θXit þ ∈it
where Yit is calorie availability in country i at time t; α0 is the
intercept; γi is the country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect capturing unob-
served, time-invariant factors that vary between countries and may
impact diets. β is the coefﬁcient of interest capturing the impact of
CUSFTA. It is estimated using a dummy variable for the treatment
status, where D¼1 in Canada during the post-CUSFTA period
1989–2006 and D¼0 otherwise. Xit is a vector of covariates with
coefﬁcients in the vector θ; following previous studies the models
control for linear time trends, Gross Domestic Product per capita,
and urbanization rates.9–11
A valid comparison country or countries should match on key
parameters, not have received the U.S. FTA “treatment,” have
available data, and exhibit parallel trends in the outcome variable
in the period preceding the treatment.19,29 Appendix 3 (available
online) describes how these criteria were applied. Brieﬂy, the
sample of potential comparison countries was restricted to
countries with available data that, like Canada, had high-income
levels; were members of the World Trade Organization and
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; and
exhibited parallel trends in calorie availability before CUSFTA, but
did not enter a U.S. FTA during the study period: Denmark, The
Netherlands, and New Zealand. Figure 1 shows that the compar-
ison countries had trends similar to Canada before CUSFTA. As a
robustness test for the sensitivity of the results to the ﬁxed-effects
model’s identifying assumptions, the analysis was also conducted
with a larger sample of countries and using the synthetic control
method.30
Statistical Analysis
The analysis was conducted in the period 1978–2006, beginning
when calorie availability and covariate data were available for all
countries in the sample and ending before the onset of the ﬁnancial
crisis in 2007–2008, as this created widespread macroeconomic
and dietary changes.31
Potential mechanisms linking CUSFTA to changes in calorie
availability were evaluated by analyzing trends in U.S. investment
and trade with the Canadian food and beverage sector. Next, the
impact of the estimated change in calorie availability attributable
to CUSFTA on individuals’ body weight was simulated using
widely applied models developed by Hall and Jordan.32 Weight
gain was estimated assuming 100% and 50% pass-through from
calorie availability to intake; Appendix 4 (available online)
provides full details. Finally, additional sensitivity analyses tested
the robustness of the results.
RESULTS
Figure 1 plots normalized trends in calorie availability in
Canada and comparison countries and shows that the
availability of calories increased markedly in Canada
after CUSFTA. In Canada, calorie availability rose from
3,028.5 kcal/capita/day in 1988 just before CUSFTA was
implemented to 3,491.0 kcal/capita/day in 2006. Thus,
calorie availability was on average 343.1 (95% CI¼294.3,
391.9) kcal/capita/day higher in Canada after CUSFTA
compared with before CUSFTA. Since 1994, the rise in
calorie availability in Canada far exceeded other coun-
tries, where calorie availability was on average 150.8 (95%
CI¼114.4, 187.1) kcal/capita/day higher post-CUSFTA
Figure 1. Normalized trends in calorie availability in Canada
and comparison countries, 1978–2006.
Note: Data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (2016).
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following a period of weak economic performance in the
late 1980s and early 1990s.33
Table 1 summarizes the results from the ﬁxed-effects
regression models and shows that CUSFTA was associ-
ated with a 170.3 (95% CI¼73.0, 267.5) kcal/capita/day
increase in calorie availability in Canada after adjusting
for covariates.
U.S. investment in the Canadian food and beverage
sector was on average US$1.82 billion (95% CI¼US$1.18,
US$2.46 billion) higher in the period 1989–2006 after
CUSFTA compared with before CUSFTA (Appendix 5,
available online). Calorie availability in Canada began
rising 5 years after an increase in U.S. Foreign Direct
Investment that started immediately after CUSFTA and
stopped rising 5 years after the rise Foreign Direct
Investment stopped in 1999 (Appendix 6, available
online). Food and beverage trade between Canada and
the U.S. also increased after CUSFTA, in both directions
(Appendix 7, available online). U.S. food and beverage
exports to Canada were US$5.26 billion (95% CI¼US
$4.89, US$5.62 billion) higher after CUSFTA.
Table 2 shows the results from the weight-gain
modeling. CUSFTA was estimated to lead to a steady-
state weight gain of between 1.8 kg and 9.3 kg for men
and 2.0 kg and 12.2 kg for women aged 40 years
depending on physical activity levels and assumed pass-
through from calorie availability to intake.
Additional analyses tested the robustness of these
results. First, as inferences from ﬁxed-effects regression
models may be sensitive to the sample selection criteria,
the effect of CUSFTA was re-estimated after incorporat-
ing additional Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development countries in the sample, including the
U.S. Results were consistent with the main analysis
(Appendix 8, available online). Second, ﬁxed-effect
models implicitly assume that the differences between
Canada and comparison countries can be captured
by covariates included in the regression model, whereas
Canada and comparison countries could differ in other
ways, which might, at least partially, account for the
results.34 This was addressed by re-estimating the impact
of CUSFTA using an alternative model: the synthetic
control method.30 Figure 2 and Appendix 9 (available
online) show that the results were consistent with the
main analysis, while reducing differences in character-
istics between Canada and the counterfactual.
Second, an in-time placebo analysis was performed to
test whether the results could be attributed to unobserved
factors driving periodic changes in calorie availability.
The coding of the CUSFTA variable was re-assigned to
1981 and then the models were re-estimated in the 1978–
1988 period. The placebo CUSFTA had no perceivable
impact on calorie availability (Appendix 10, available
online). Third, although all countries experienced a
decline in calorie availability just before CUSFTA, the
results could be attributable to a recovery from to a pre-
Table 1. Estimated Effect of CUSFTA on Calorie Availability in Canada: Fixed-Effects Regression Results
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CUSFTA, coefﬁcient (95% CI) 343.1 (294.3, 391.9) 194.0 (119.2, 268.7) 170.3 (73.0, 267.5)
US$100 increase in GDP per capita, coefﬁcient (95% CI) — — 1.1 (–0.03, 2.3)
1% increase in rate of urbanization, coefﬁcient (95% CI) — — 17.1 (–6.5, 40.8)
Controls for ﬁxed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Controls for time trends? No Yes Yes
Country years 116 116 116
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.62 0.62
Note: Boldface indicates statistical signiﬁcance (po0.05). Models were estimated using cluster-robust SEs grouped at the country level. Results from
the Hausman test ﬁrmly rejected the null hypothesis of independence between the random-effects estimate and the error term, favoring the ﬁxed-
effects over the random-effects estimator.
CUSFTA, Canada U.S. Free Trade Agreement; GDP, Gross Domestic Product.
Table 2. Estimated Increase in Body Weight by Sex and
Physical Activity Level From a 170-kcal and 85-kcal Rise in
Daily Caloric Intake
Physical
activity level Sex
Estimated weight gain, kg
170 kcal/
capita/day
85 kcal/
capita/day
Lowa Female 12.2 4.4
Highb Female 5.3 2.0
Lowa Male 9.3 3.9
Highb Male 4.0 1.8
Note: Figures show the estimated increase in body weight among males
aged 40 years and ﬁgures once body weight reaches a steady state (i.e.,
after accounting for the dynamic physiological adaptations that occur
during weight gain). Weight gain ﬁgures are based on average weight
and height, by sex, adults aged 40 years in the Canadian Health
Promotion Survey, 1990.28 Appendix 4 (available online) provides full
details.
aEquivalent to walking 2.2 miles per day at 3–4 miles per hour (mph).
bEquivalent to walking 17 miles per day at 3–4 mph.
kcal, kilocalorie.
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intervention dip in Canada. As recommended in Ber-
trand et al.,35 the models were re-estimated after exclud-
ing observations 2 years to either side of CUSFTA. The
effect estimate for CUSFTA was consistent with the main
analysis (Appendix 10, available online). Fourth, the
sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of any speciﬁc
country in the sample was evaluated by iteratively
omitting each country from the sample and re-estimating
the ﬁxed-effects model. The effect estimate for CUSFTA
was substantively comparable across sample speciﬁca-
tions (Appendix 11, available online).
DISCUSSION
This analysis suggests that calorie availability in Canada
increased by approximately 170 kcal/capita/day after
CUSFTA. This coincided with a US$1.82 billion (95%
CI¼US$1.18, US$2.46 billion) increase in U.S. invest-
ment in the Canadian food and beverage industry and a
US$5.26 billion (95% CI¼US$4.89, US$5.62 billion) rise
in food and beverage imports from the U.S. The rise in
caloric availability was estimated to lead to an average
weight gain of 1.8–9.3 kg for men and 2.0–12.2 kg for
women who were aged 40 years, depending on their
physical activity levels and assumed pass-through from
availability to intake. These results were robust across
different model and sample speciﬁcations.
This study suggests that CUSFTA altered dietary
behavior substantially by increasing calorie availability
in Canada. These ﬁndings are consistent with previous,
narrower studies ﬁnding that trade agreements with the
U.S. create food environments that more closely resemble
the unhealthy obesogenic environment that pertains in
the U.S.6
This analysis also advances previous research in three
important ways. First, the study ﬁnds more robust evidence
to suggest a causal impact of FTAs on diets. Unlike
previous analyses, the exceptional circumstances surround-
ing CUSFTA’s implementation provided a unique quasi-
experimental setting that created as-if random implemen-
tation, an isolated FTA, a clear pre- and post-intervention
cut off, and overcame anticipatory effects.
Second, this analysis suggests that U.S. FTAs can
impact the number of calories that are available and
likely consumed. The estimated impact on weight gain is
consistent with observed increases in obesity rates among
Canadian adults, rising from 5.6% in 1985 to 14.7% in
2003.36 Of course, the rise in calorie availability after
CUSFTA would not necessarily have contributed to
rising obesity had calorie supplies been insufﬁcient
before CUSFTA, or had physical activity increased in
parallel. Yet, calorie supplies met energy needs in 1984
before CUSFTA came into force.37 Furthermore, Bleich
and colleagues38 reported that 100% of the rise in obesity
in Canada from 1990 to 2002 was attributable to a 513
kcal/capita/day rise in calorie availability over the period,
as there was no coinciding decline in physical activity.
CUSFTA was associated with an approximately 170 kcal
rise in calorie availability, which constitutes approxi-
mately 33% of the total increase, from 1990 to 2002.
CUSFTA may have contributed up to 33% of the rise
obesity during the period by pushing up caloric intake.
Finally, existing studies of FTAs and related liberaliza-
tion policies have emphasized the role of trade rather
than investment in mediating their consequences.6
Changes to calorie availability in Canada diverged from
comparison countries since 1994 and so corresponded to
changes in U.S. investment in the Canadian food and
beverage sector at a 5-year time delay. This suggests that
investment was at least as important as trade in medi-
ating the impact of CUSFTA on diets, and that the time
needed for increased investment to translate into
increased production accounted for the delayed rise in
calorie availability after CUSFTA.39
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, calorie avail-
ability is an imperfect measure of caloric intake and
potential weight gain because of difﬁculties in estimating
wastage and home production. Nevertheless, calorie
availability is a widely used proxy for consumption that
has several strengths compared with survey-based meas-
urements that are subject to recall or social approval
biases.40,41 Second, it is not feasible to conduct a fully
randomized experiment to assess the effects of FTAs.
Figure 2. Synthetic control results.
Note: Synthetic control 1 shows results using original sample of
comparison countries. Synthetic control 2 shows results using a larger
sample of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
comparison countries as the synthetic control method relaxes the
parallel trends assumption. Appendix 7 (available online) provides full
details.
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One or more factors that were beyond the researchers’
knowledge and control may account for the results.
However, in situations where experimental manipulation
is unfeasible, as is the case with FTAs, the natural
experiment design used in this study is recommended
as the best means for evaluating causal effects.42 Third,
the models adjust for Gross Domestic Product per capita
and urbanization, which were plausibly impacted by
CUSFTA. The results were nevertheless consistent across
model speciﬁcations with and without controls. The
attenuation of the CUSFTA effect estimate when these
variables were incorporated also suggests that they led to
conservative estimates.
Canadian idiosyncrasies and contextual factors at the
time CUSFTA was implemented may nevertheless limit
the external validity of this analysis. However, this study
may be informative, as CUSFTA was a blueprint for later
FTAs.20 In addition, limited data availability precluded a
direct analysis of changes to weight gain, related health
outcomes, and their socioeconomic stratiﬁcation. Future
research should address these limitations.
CONCLUSIONS
Notwithstanding its limitations, this study has important
implications for policy. Public health scholars have long
argued that dietary choices and obesity are inﬂuenced by
food environments, which are, in turn, shaped by macro-
structural factors.43,44 This analysis suggests that FTAs
can lead to a substantial rise in calorie availability and
likely intake, which plays a critical role in the develop-
ment of obesity. Thus, this study shows empirically how
trade policy is a macrostructural driver of dietary
behaviors.44 This paper also strengthens the legitimacy
of growing concerns raised during FTA negotiations
about the potentially detrimental impacts of U.S. FTAs
and the need for greater coherence between nutrition and
trade policy making.5,45
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